+29

I just noticed how what I described in the preceding post may not fit the formal process of making a law without leaving a record for that initial spending approval. I guess that using the expression "make no law" instead of present no Bill or something like that for example, and probably also the reference to "law" instead of Law (which was also a practice that was kept throughout the Bill of Rights in contrast with the original constitution) made me forget about the formal law making process and instead think about it as an entirely internal process for Congress (Even then there maybe an issue with the internal record keeping not mentioning that initial approval but I am talking about what made me go this direction to begin with).

However, I also noticed a little while ago that I probably gave weight to that action by that Congress much more than I should because I failed to realize that was before ratifying the Amendment. Until the ratification to be part of the constitution for an Amendment is completed it would have no effect as if it does not exist. Because of this, one may actually ask why should we consider any weight for that action instead of taking it as irrelevant to begin with? Still if we force a relevance on ourselves here, why should that be to the direction where the court took that? It can be taken exactly to the opposite of that if we take the action as intended to be done before it becomes impermissible if the Amendment gets ratified. It seems hardly explainable why the court was more willing to take that action as being caused by less restrictive understanding for the Amendment than  that because it was not effective yet. Also what happened to that less restrictive taking for the establishment clause through out all that long time after the ratification? How much can we find what support taking the Amendment that way through out, say, seventy years after that ratification which is a very long time when it comes to holding people from invoking their religions? It is ironic how as much as the court talked about the strength of connection between people and their religion here as much as it also strengthened the indication of the absence of signs for its position as long as that continued after the ratification as an argument against its position.

But I also, after reading the related part in the opinion of the court (LYNCH V. DONNELLY) more carefully, think that I could have been wrong or hasty in my argument against its association of Thanksgiving with Christmas because I depended on the common understanding to the origin of the former.