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Continued from the preceding post

I read somewhere on the Internet describing the Congress chaplain enactment of 1789 as a violation of law. I emphasize again that unless I am wrong in my understanding that a constitutional amendment does not become law even on the segment that just approved it until the ratification is complete, there was no violation of law there because the Amendment was not the law yet.

Back to the opinion of the court. According to that opinion the Constitution "affirmatively mandates accommodation, not merely tolerance, of all religions". Although this may not matter much here I still want to ask where does it say or imply that? The First Amendment stated the required relation with religion in a way that does not leave a gap to be filled by that.

At first glance it may sound like that opinion contains some strong support for the court. However, on subsequent looks one may find that it contains or imply more than that toward its own demolition. For example, referring to how congress made Christmas and Thanksgiving as holidays might first look impressive for the court until that fires back when one finds out how late that have happened. So why was not that or any thing similar to it in designating respect toward religion approved by Congress earlier if the reason was not being restricted by the establishment clause? The court itself even support you more when it says " Beginning in the early colonial period long before Independence, a day of Thanksgiving was celebrated as a religious holiday to give thanks for the bounties of Nature as gifts from God". So what prevented Congress from formally applying that tradition until so late later? Also, when the court speaks about the deep history of having the presidents honoring Thanksgiving it takes less than what it gives because the establishment clause has nothing to do with the executive branch. On the other hand it makes one wonder what made Congress abstain from doing the same throughout all that earlier period if it were not because of the establishment clause . Notice how much the significance of such points is augmented when one adds the attachment to religion which the enactment related to chaplains for congress imply. It suggests even more that the abstinence mentioned above is an active choice resulted from consideration of related factors. Or, who knows, it might be even the intention of  those people for that chaplain thing is to show that indifference is not the reason for future restrictions toward respecting establishments of religions. Add to that the proximity to the making and approving the Amendment and you would get a picture much more worthy of following than that of those later times. 

On the other hand, the approval of those holidays was, in addition to the time separation, also not far enough after the civil war to exclude as a motive making relatively small sacrifices like these to heal the wounds by bringing the nation together through common things after such disaster.  

It seems that none of the examples cited by the court for congress violation of the Amendment if not understood the way for which it argues goes back close enough, like, for example, before that civil war.